We use a new database covering 1.2 million active participants to study trading activities in 1,530 defined contribution retirement plans. Descriptive statistics and regression analysis indicate some interesting trading patterns. First, we show that trading activity in 401(k) accounts is very limited: only 20% of participants ever reshuffled their portfolios in two years. Second, demographic characteristics are strongly associated with trading activities: traders are older, wealthier, more highly paid, male employees with longer plan tenure. Finally, we find that plan design factors, such as the number of funds offered, loan availability, and specific fund-families offered have significant impacts on 401(k) plan participants' trading behavior. Moreover, on-line access channels stimulate participants to trade more frequently, although they do not increase turnover ratio as much. We conclude that plan design features are crucial in sharing trading patterns in 401(k) plans.
Introduction
Individually-managed 401(k) accounts are now the most widespread investment form for retirement saving in the U.S. Currently, about one-third of all workers are enrolled in 401(k) plans, managing near $1.9 trillion in assets 2 Although some theoretical financial research papers suggest that the individual trading behavior can influence the returns and volatility of the financial market (e.g. Bertola and Foresi 1995, Odean 1998) , little is known about how people actually invest their 401(k) plan assets.
Further, there is nothing known about how their trading patterns might influence retirement outcomes. Recent empirical research by Odean and his colleagues (Odean 1999; Odean 2000, 2001) provides evidence on trading activities and portfolio performance of individual investors, but these papers focus on the discount brokerage accounts, representing only a narrow and probably non representative subset of the universe of individual investors. In addition, because discount brokerage account holders are those who presumably like to trade, it is necessary to pay attention to self-selection bias to interpret their results. For defined contribution accounts, as far as we know, Agnew (2003) is the only empirical analysis focusing on the relationship between individual trading activities and their demographic characteristics in 401(k) plans. Consequently, nevertheless that it is necessary to confirm whatever previous results can be extended to other broader databases. We also need to investigate whether other factors beyond demographics also drive participants to trade their pension portfolios.
In this paper, we use an invaluable new dataset, provided by the Vanguard Group on more than 3 million 401(k) participants in over 2,000 plans, to illustrate how participant and plan characteristics shape trading behavior in individually-held voluntary retirement accounts. We The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review previous literature on individual investor trading patterns. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics regarding trading behavior. In Section 5, we present our multivariate analysis methodology, hypotheses, and regression results. Conclusions appear in Section 6.
Previous Literature
Although there is a substantial theoretical literature regarding individual portfolio trading behavior, most of it has not focused on investment patterns in defined contribution retirement accounts. For instance, the conventional financial theory suggests that investors will trade when the marginal benefit of trading equals or exceeds the marginal cost (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) .
By contrast, overconfidence theory predicts that investors will trade to their detriment (Gervais and Odean, 2001) . Recently, Mitchell, Muermann, and Volkman (2004) have found that anticipated regret regarding investment outcomes prevents a regret-prone investor from making extreme portfolio allocations, which would make him more likely to rebalance his account as compared to a more conventional rational investor.
To date, little empirical literature has explored trading patterns in retirement accounts, though there has been much research on interesting and unexpected patterns of trading in discount brokerage accounts. A set of studies by Odean and his co-authors (Odean 1999; Odean 2000, 2001) supports the overconfidence theory more than rational expectations framework with the existence of transaction cost. Using data on trading activities of 78,000 discount brokerage accounts, they computed the transaction cost, defined as the sum of bid-ask spread and commission fees. Comparing realized returns and the transaction costs, they provide evidence on trading behavior and investment performance of individual investors. For an instance, they conclude that people tend to trade too much; trading behavior appears hazardous to investors' portfolio performance (Barber and Odean, 2000) ; men appear to trade more than women because they are more overconfident (Barber and Odean, 2001 ).
In addition, King and Leape (1987) examine the changes in portfolio composition over the life cycle from the transaction cost approach. Using 1,978 Survey of Consumer Financial
Decisions conducted by SRI (Stanford Research Institute), they studied the portfolio selection problem of over 6,010 U.S. households. They classify investment vehicles into "informationintensive assets" such as individual equity and other assets, and then they report that the ownership of "information-intensive" assets increases even after controlling changes in wealth, marginal tax rate and household characteristics. Therefore, the authors conclude that leaning and experience are important factors in lowering transaction costs overtime, leading to a positive relationship between investors' ages and "information-intensive" portfolio selection.
Empirical studies on trading in 401(k) plans are few in number, mainly because until now, analysts have not had good quality data on a wide variety of plan designs and participant outcomes. To our knowledge, Agnew et al (2003) focusing on a single large 401(k) plan is the only empirical work which explores participants' trading patterns and their portfolio selection problem. That analysis studied about 6,500 retirement accounts during April 1994-August 1998.
At first, the authors examined the asset allocation and trading activities patterns using tabulations, and then they regressed equity allocation, turnover ratio and annual trade number on a set of demographic variables including age, sex, salary, marital status, and time in the plan. In addition, Agnew et al. also track participants over time, which makes it possible to investigate how equity allocation and trading behavior change as individuals' age and gain seniority on the job. It also allows their study to model the dependent variables as a function of common time effect. Finally, they conclude that most asset allocations are extreme (either 100% or 0%), and there is inertia in asset re-allocations; equity allocations are higher for males, married investors and for investors with higher earnings and more seniority on the job; equity allocations are lower for the elder people. They find only limited portfolio reshuffling, in sharp contrast to discount brokerage accounts.
Whether the results in Agnew et al. (2003) are generalizeable is in question. For example, it would be useful to confirm whether their finding is specific to t hat single plan, or rather whether it is a general phenomenon across plans. Moreover, when interpreting the common time-effect both on equity allocations and trading behavior, it is also necessary to take into account that before April 1994 (the beginning point of their database), participants were only able to invest in Guaranteed Investment Contracts (GICs). In addition, we also need to investigate whether other factors beyond demographics can also influence individual trading activities. 3 In particula r, we seek to learn whether plan design is sharing participants' trading behavior.
As far as we know, our current investigation is the first comprehensive study on 401(k) trading activities across multiple plans. It is distinguished from previous studies in 2 ways: First,
we study a database of over 3 million DC retirement accounts across above 2,000 plans, which will enable us to examine a larger subset of the 401(k) universe. Second, we can study trading patterns at the participant-level as a function of both participant and plan-level variables.
Database and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we describe our new database. In Part A, we introduce the raw data and discuss its reprensentativeness. Part B summarizes investment options, industry, and plan-level information. Part C presents participant-level characteristics.
A. The Vanguard Database
This study uses a new database provided by the Vanguard Group (VG), contained information on more than 3 million DC plan accounts across 2,252 401(k) plans. Those plans included 984 funds in the investment menu 4 over the period Jan 2003 -Dec 2004 . This is hierarchical database that consists of 5 levels: time, industry, plan, participant and trade.
At the industry level, the database codes every plan sponsor based on 4-digit NAIC 5 criteria, which have been aggregated into ten industries.
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At the plan level, the plan files record the major plan design features such as the number of funds offered, employer company stock as an investment option, and loan availability. In particular, this file enables us to figure out changes in investment menu for each plan, so we can evaluate the impact on participant level trading behavior. Table 2 ).
Given the investment choice available in each plan, participants are allowed to alter their asset allocation patterns without any commission fees on a daily basis. It is worth nothing that all participants in a given plan will be required to reallocate their assets from one specific fund to the other available options, if their plan sponsor decides to drop a given fund from the menu. In this case, we call this type of trade as "Plan-wide trade". 9 On the other hand, participants are never required to allocate any asset to newly-added funds.
In Table 3 (insert Table 3 ), we summarize the industry leve l and plan-level characteristics of our sample. On average, plans offered about 17 funds as of Jan 2003, of which 10 were equity funds, 4 fixed income funds, and 3 balanced funds. There was a very wide range of plan design with 86 funds for maximum and one fund as minimum. It is also interesting to document that the average participant only holds a positive balance in 3.5 funds. In order to check whether menu change affects participants' trading activities, we also check whether plans have ever changed their investment option. Of the 1,530 plans, there were 513 plans which ever added new funds 9 For further definition of plan-wide trade, refer to Appendix 2.
and 121 plans ever dropped at least one fund, and the rest 896 never changed their investment options.
Turning to the investment menus offered, most plans offered indexed equity funds, and international equity funds were available for over 90% plans. Although only in 15% plans (229) the employer company stock was a possible choice, because those plans are large, half of the participants could invest in their employer's share. In January 2003, about three quarters of the plans allowed participants to borrow from their DC retirement account, which covers 85% sampled participants.
We also review the distribution of life-cycle fund offering dummy. Life-cycle funds, also called as "life-stage" or "target-date" funds provide a mechanism to automatically reduce the proportion of the portfolio held in equities as an investor ages. In our sample, the Vanguard Group offers a set of "Target Retirement Funds", each of whic h has a target retirement year (2005, 2015, …, 2045) . As the target year approaches, the investment management will gradually shift the funds from equities to bonds or MMF. In practice, the allocation changes are not directly linked to any particular investor's age, but those funds are marketed to those who plan to retire in time close to the target date of the fund. The idea is that investors who do not want to or are unable to spend money and time to take care of their asset allocation, will more easily manage their retirement assets. In our sample, there are 744 plans (49%) providing this kind of investment vehicle.
C. Participant Characteristics
Next, we present descriptive statistics of participant level data. Demographic characteristics of participants are shown in Panel A of Table 4 (insert Table 4 ). On-line trading has been proposed as a cause of excessive trading, Metrick et al. (2002) and several previous studies show that internet trading channels increase individual investors' trading frequency in discount brokerage accounts and 401(k) plans. 13 We generate a web-access dummy variable, defined as equal to1 if a participant holds a web access to his account, and 0 otherwise. Some 37.4% of our sample accounts are able to do web trading.
Evidence of Trading Ac tivities
In this section, we provide the definitions regarding trading activities, present descriptive statistics, and then summarize some trading patterns.
A. Measuring Trading Activities
All trade orders issued by a 401(k) plan participant within the same day will be executed at the end price (3:00pm) for each fund. Accordingly, we define a Trade as an asset allocation change in a day, which consists of both a sell record and a buy record of at least one fund and a positive trade amount become recorded. For each trade, we compute the total sale/buy allocation 11 IXI is a private company which provides wealth measures by ZIP code, for detail, refer to http://www.ixicorp.com. 12 This ratio might be different across accounts in a given plan. e.g, given 15% as the upper limit for total compensation, 6% as upper limit as employer contribution with 100% match ratio, a participant with 6% employee contribution has different Employee Contribution Ratio with a person with 9% employee contribution. 13 As the example of empirical studies based on discount brokerage accounts, refer to Barber and Odean (2001) , as a example of 401(k) plan studies, refer to Choi, Laibson and Metrick (2002) . fndtotassets t : total assets in the end of period t;
fndtotassets_avrg: average total assets;
Ratio_turnover_smpl: turnover ratio.
B. Plan-level Trading Activities
Previous research suggests that offering a large number of funds provides diversification opportunities for knowledgeable participants. Thus can lead to increase trading probabilities; on the other hand, too much variety in the investment menu may cause information overload problem (Agnew and Szykman, 2004) : a lot of choices also potentially limit 401(k) participants' trading activities.
It is also possible to examine how investment package affects participants' trading behavior from an efficiency perspective. Given an efficient investment frontier, for example, maybe an indexed equity fund, a rational investor maybe only need to put his money in that fund, and he may not need to select individual assets to create his own efficient portfolio.
As described in section 3, industrial recommendation of life-cycle funds suggests that this type of investment vehicle makes asset management easier. Designed for one-stop investment shopping, life-cycle funds distribute investors' money among various other funds, changing their asset allocation as they enter different life stages. Of course, rational and engaged investors may find such kind of investment vehicles redundant. However, for investors who may not know their risk tolerance, the overwhelming number of options may seem like more of a curse than a blessing, therefore, life-cycle funds can make portfolio selection problem easier: automatic adjustment mechanism makes them maintenance-free for investors.
Another industrial story suggests that offering international funds provides international arbitrage opportunities, and thus, increase investors' trading probabilities. This may be particularly appealing to speculative transactions. For example, if one expected the value of Japanese Yen to increase enough to cover transactions cost tomorrow in the eastern U.S. time zone, just buying tonight in Tokyo money market, and then selling tomorrow in N.Y. market, may the investor make money. participants' asset allocation behavior (insert Table 5 ).
Our data shows evidence to support those theoretical implications. For example, the plan-level trading propensity, which is defined as the ratio of trader to active participants per plan, has a hump shape associated with the number of funds offered. It increases from 14.4% in plans offering 1-5 funds to 17.7% and 21.5% in groups with 6-10, and 11-17 investment choice respectively, and then hits its peak of 23.6% in plans with 18-30 funds. Finally, it starts to decrease to 19.6% as a plan offers more than 30 funds. This pattern may suggest that adding new funds to investment menu does increase participants' trading probability due to more diversification opportunities, but this effect decreases marginally and there exists an upper bound.
Trading propensity in plans offering international equity funds or employers' company stock also is significantly higher than those plans without those types of investment choice.
More than 20% of participants in an international equity available plan have ever reallocated their portfolios in our sample, which is 3.5% points higher than a plan lacking international equity funds. Company stock availability also contributes to activate exchange activities: there is 3.9% point spread of trading propensity between plans offering company stock and those not.
There are no obvious different trading patterns between plans offering life-cycle funds, indexed equity funds, and loan availability with those plans that do not have those options. In order to investigate if these variables influence participants' trading activities significantly, we need to analyze our data using a multivariable approach. Table 6 presents the participant level trading activities, which are measured as 1) trading probability, 2) trade number, and 3) turnover ratio. Only 20.5% of the 401(k) accounts ever altered their portfolio allocations over two-year, which indicates trading activities in individualmanaged retirement accounts are very limited. This result is also consistent which the statistics in Agnew et al. (2003) single plan study, which showed about 88% participants have no trades.
C. Participant-level Trading Activities
In our data, conditional on trading, the average sample turnover ratio reached almost 90%, which means on average a trader changed his asset allocations by 90% over two-year period (insert Table 6 ).
Transaction cost theory tells us that investors will change their asset mix if when the marginal benefits from trading is no less than the marginal cost. Given fixed transaction costs, it will be optimal for investors to relocate their assets infrequently with a discrete amount.
Transaction costs could be classified into explicit and implicit costs. The explicit costs are always expressed in a monetary form suc h as bid-ask spread, commission fees in case of common stocks or trustee fees in the case of mutual funds. On the other hand, implicit costs may take the forms of opportunity costs such as time spent on information collection and information analysis. Because trading is free for all of the sampled accounts, thus, in our case, implicit costs are supposed to be the only transaction cost.
14 The implications of the transaction cost theory can also be captured by investors' characteristics. For instance, as King and Leape (1987) have argued, learning, experience and knowledge can lower the fixed transaction costs and thus lead to increase trading probability.
This suggests that elder participants in knowledge-intensive industries ( e,g, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) are likely to reshuffle their portfolio more frequently with bigger magnitude.
Meanwhile, longer plan tenure not only capture investors' degree of knowledge on their plan and trading experience, and also indicate bigger balances, which will increase the likelihood of trading. Table 6 presents the trading probability for each group sorted by participants' demographic features. We see that men are more likely to trade their assets significantly. Nearly one quarter (24.1%) participants have ever changed their portfolio allocations over the two-year period, but only 17.9% among females. These unbalanced trading probabilities are consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis and the empirical results in Barber and Odean (2001) : men are more overconfident than women, so men are more likely to trade. Of course, the sharp contrast between males and females could also be explained by the transaction cost framework 15 .
That is females often have lower salary, smaller financial wealth and less investment literacy compared to men.
The trading probability increases as participants get older for almost all age ranges. For investors under 35, only 16.9% participants have trading experience, in 36-45 years old group, this ratio goes up to 18.9%, and then it climbs 22.8% in 46-54 group, and it finally hits its peak of 25.1% in 55-64 group. This increasing trend fits the transaction cost theory described above, and the sharp decrease in trading among the over 65 years old group can also be rationalized: the portfolio allocation should have been exchanged to relative safe assets, thus reduce the motivation to rebalance their assets to safer options.
Trading probability has a monotonically increasing trend with participants' plan tenure.
The trading probability jumps from 17.4% in the participant group with less than 5 plan years, to 31.7% for investors who have already stayed in the same plan over 25 years. Obviously, this pattern is consistent with the theoretical implication as described above: the longer an investor stays in the same plan, the better he understands the plan, and the more experience/knowledge he has, which will increase his trading likelihood. On the other hand, presumably, longer plan tenure also usually implies a bigger plan balance, which indicates possible substantial benefits from trading activities, thus motivates the investor to exchange his asset allocations.
Wealthier investors and participants with higher salaries are also more likely to trade.
We categorized our participant level observations as low income/wealth group if household income/IXI wealth was under the sample median, and those who were above median as the high group. The probability of investors in the high income group is 23.1% significantly, which is nearly 6% points higher than their low income counterparts. People in the high wealth group are likely to relocate their assets with a probability near one-quarter, but the poor participants did less than one-fifth of the higher.
Our finding is consistent with those results reported in previous studies: traders are older, wealthier, more highly paid, male employees, who have higher balance in their accounts. People in the financial industry also trade more frequently than in other industries.
Trade numbers are drawn from a very skewed distribution. As shown in Table 7 , 79.5%
accounts have zero trade in two years. Even among the traders, over half had only 1 trade.
Roughly speaking, our 401(k) sampled participants altered their asset allocations 0.3 times in one year; that is to say they only trade once every 3.33 years on average. However, there is another extreme group who are trading more than 50 times over 2 years (insert Table 7 ).
Trade number patterns associated with participants' demographic characteristics are similar to trading probability. Turnover ratios correlate with trade numbers. On average, participants changed the composition of only 18% of their assets, but conditional on trading, the average turnover ratio for sample traders climbed to 89.7%. When we sort turnover ratios by participants' demographic characteristics, we confirm portfolio exchangers were likely to be men, older, high-income, wealthier, and had longer plan tenure investors compared their female, younger, low-income, lower wealth and shorter plan tenure counterparts. However, on-line access did not increase the sample turnover ratio as dramatically as it did on trade numbers, maybe because internet channels only convince people to trade more frequently but reduce the trade amount per exchange compared with the case if they had traded with a conventional way. This is also consistent with the empirical study results in Choi, Laibson and Metrick (2002) , which is based on two large 401(k) plans plan level trading records.
All of these statistics are consistent with the single plan examined by Agnew et al. (2003) .
We conclude that trading activity is extremely limited in 401(k) accounts.
Regression Analysis
This section summarized hypotheses to test, describes our regression methodology, presents regression results and then compares them with the conclusions from other empirical studies. Table 8 presents independent variables associated with the hypotheses we seek to test, and shows the predicted signs in the regression analysis (insert Table 8 ). We can summaries it as follows:
A. Hypotheses
1) Transaction Cost Hypotheses: Trading will be more prevalent among the people in financial literacy intensive industry like Finance, Insurance and Real Estate for industry level; older, highly paid, longer-tenured, wealthier, web-registered participants are more likely to reshuffle their assets. Offering life-cycle funds can make portfolio sele ction easier, thus, it would reduce trading propensity.
2) Overconfidence hypothesis: Because men are more confident than women, trading will be more prevalent among males more than females.
3) Diversification Hypothesis: the more funds offered at the plan level, the more likely people will trade; as international funds provide arbitrage opportunities, international funds may boost trading likelihood; offering company stock diversify the investment menu, thus increases the trading probability. 
B. Regression Methodology
For the regression analysis, we focus on three dependent variables: sample trader, trade number and turnover ratio. They measure the trading probabilities, trading frequency and trading magnitude, respectively.
We categorize the independent variables into three levels including five sub-classes:
industry, plan, and participant levels. We do not control on time because two year is not long enough to estimate time effects. The specific independent variables are shown as below:
1) Industry Level: Industry Dummy. We code nine dummy variables based on the VG classification with the reference industry being manufacturing. turnover ratio is a non-negative real number. The GLM relaxes the normality assumption required for a conventional regression model, and only requires the underlying distributions for dependent variables belong to the exponential family. 16 In addition, by mixing or compounding two distributions, GLM also enables us to handle models with more complicate underlying distributions.
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We also adopt a mixed error structure due to the hierarchical structure of our independent variables, which would generate serial correlation and heteroscadasticity problem. The multilevel regression approach provides extremely flexible variation for the error term structure, which enables us to test random effects, fixed effects and robust standard errors models.
In our analysis, we use the following regression model: 
C. Regression Results

1) Sample Trader
With the GLMM approach, we can rewrite our regression function for Sample Trader according to a usual Probit regression model:
, where Φ −1 is the inverse CDF of Normal Distribution Table 9 presents the regression results. The estimator indicates a very high joint significance of the independent variables. The pseudo-R 2 is 10.9% and the concordant percent is 72.7%, which implies the specification validity of the whole model. Compared a model that include only demographic factors as in Agnew et al. (2003) , our current model also shows a significant advantage. This evident in the absolute difference of the likelihood ratio between the two models, but it also appears in the improvement of pseudo-R 2 and concordant percent, which increase 8.4% points (10.9%-2.5%=8.4%) and 12.0% (72.7%-60.7%=12.0%) respectively (insert Table 9 ).
Our most remarkable finding is that most of the plan level variables affect investors' trading likelihood significantly. Trading probability rises as the number of funds offered grows as well as the number of fund changes. However, the sign of the square of number of funds offered is negative. From the marginal effects regarding the number of funds and number of 18 Monte Carlo simulation results suggest the biggest cluster should not larger than 5% of total observations. In our case, 59,350 participants are enrolled in the largest plan, which is just 5% (59350/1186554=5%). 19 Theoretically, it is also possible to build multi-level regression with multiple random effects: industry and plan. However, those computation tasks are beyond a usual computer capacity even using the most time-efficient optimization technique.
funds squared (+0.000561 vs. -0.00005), we can easily calculate the positive effects reach its peak at the 54 th fund. This fact suggests that our results support the diversification hypotheses:
adding new funds to the investment menu does stimulate participants to alter their portfolio allocations, although this effect diminishes as the total number of funds offered grows.
Offering a loan makes investors less much to change their asset mix with marginal effect of 2.2%. On the other hand, company stock availability encourages participants to change their portfolios. Meanwhile, investors do make their trading decisions depending on whether their plan sponsors offer an indexed equity fund. Controlling on other factors, a 401(k) plan participant is 44% less likely to trade if his plan offers an indexed equity fund, compared to a plan lacking such a fund.
We also find that offering Life-cycle funds reduces investors' trading probability because of its automatic risk adjustment mechanism, and an international equity fund encourages participants to change their asset allocations by 3.7% due to the potential international arbitrage opportunities.
Participant level independent variables confirm to those regarded in previous studies.
Demographic characteristics such as sex, age, and plan tenure positively correlate with investors' trading probability with consistent learning and experience hypotheses. Ten more years of age boosts the trading probability by 2.1%; ten more years of plan tenure arises it by 3%.
Men alter their 401(k) portfolio composition 4.65% more than females.
Household income and financial wealth also significantly affect investors' trading probability. A 1% increase in household income raises people's trading probability by 2.9%, and the increase in the ratio of financial assets over household income also correlates positively with trading probability.
2) Trade Number
In the regression function for trade number, we assume the dependent variable is drawn from Poisson distribution, and the parameter of Poisson distribution is from a Gamma distribution. As a result, the trade number is assumed to be distributed as Negative Binomial, which is the mixture of Poisson and Gamma. In GLMM estimation, we use a log link function.
In fact, we can interpret those statistical procedures as a method to capture individual heterogeneity in an econometric model. If we add another individual heterogeneity term ζ into the error, a usual Poisson Regression with cross-individual heterogeneity could be written as: 
In our regression function, we need to estimate parameter vectors, β,γ,δ in the Poisson part, and θ, the parameter in the Gamma part, which is also called overdispersion parameter.
Table 10 presents the estimator results. As before with the trade propensity function, our independent variables work significantly well to explain the dependent variable (insert Table 10 ).
For the plan-level variables, offering company stock and international equity funds are the main plan design features that stimulate participants to trade more frequently; these increase trade number by 23% and 17% respectively. Offering more funds significantly encourages investors to exchange more frequently, but the magnitude of the effect is relatively small (one more fund offered causes 1.1% rise in trade number).
Demographic characteristics also return their explanatory power to interpret individual investors' trading number as appeared in trade propensity function. Again, male, higher paid, richer, and longer plan tenured participants trade more frequently than their counterparts.
Another interesting result is that individual on-line access motivates investors to exchange their asset mixture significantly more and with a very high magnitude.
In addition, the overdispersion parameter is estimated to be 4.78, which is significantly not equal to zero and suggests individual heterogeneity can not be captured by demographic characteristics alone.
3) Sample Turnover Ratio Table 11 presents a Heckman second-stage OLS regression results for the turnover ratio.
We adopt the Heckman second-stage regression rather than a conventional censored regression method because we want to explicitly decompose the explanatory power of independent variables into two parts: the indirect effects through trading probability, and the direct effects conditional on trading (insert Table 11 ).
The coefficient regarding the inverse Mills ratio from the 1 st -stage Probit regression, is estimated to be 0.75, which suggests all of the independent variables jointly explain the turnover ratio indirectly through increasing trading probability.
At the plan-level, offering international equity funds and offering indexed equity funds are still correlated the turnover ratio as seen in the trading propensity and the trade number functions. However, the number of funds offered and its square changed their signs suggesting that traders tend to exchange their 401(k) assets a subset of funds, and do not intend to extend their portfolio variety.
D. Implication
So far, we have followed the analysis framework of Agnew et al. (2003) by investigating the trading patterns in 401(k) retirement accounts. We confirm the fact that the trading activity in 401(k) retirement accounts is extremely limited: only 20% participants ever altered their portfolios within a two year period. Demographics hence can explain trading patterns in the ways that supports the theoretical implications.
However, our analysis is distinguished with previous studies in several points.
First, we find that plan design can explain trading behavior. Offering indexed funds and loans significantly reduces participants trading, while offering international equity funds and employer' company stock gives investors more motivation to trade assets. The more funds the plan sponsor offers, the more actively participants trade, but that effect increases at a decreasing rate.
Second, instead of conventional Tobit regression, we use Heckman 2-stage regression method for sample turnover ratio analysis. Therefore, we explicitly show the direct and indirect effect from the same independent variable. For example, even controlling on traders ( i.e.
controlling on the indirect effects through trading probability), plan design still retain its significant power to explain the traders' turnover ratio.
It is easy to obtain the intuitive implications for plan sponsors and participants from our finding. Table 12 summarizes the marginal effects on 401(k) participants' trading behavior (insert Table 12 ).
As described above, although there is no any explicit transaction fee for trading 401(k) portfolios, ultimately, the transaction costs must be shared by mutual fund companies, plan sponsors, and participants in other forms. Therefore, the inertia trading activity in 401(k) accounts directly indicates cost saving for the plan sponsor if it shares part of the transaction costs. However, it is not clear whether the limit trading behavior is positive or negative for participants before examine the trading performance: maybe limit trading make investors pass over some better investment opportunities, it is also possible that limit trading protects investors from rather worse investment outcome.
On the other hands, it may be necessary to take into account the impact on participants'
trading activity from the plan design factors when an employer designs its' 401(k) plan. For example, the most efficient way to minimize the trading probability, the number of trading, and the turnover ratio is to offer an indexed equity fund. In fact, more than 95% of our sampled plans hold at least one such fund in the investment menu. Meanwhile, offering international equity funds, employer company stock, and brokerage options is the effective way to diversify the investment options, and thus attract the participants. In order to control the trading probability to a pre-determined target, offering life-cycle funds can offset the positive diversification effects by adding 13 new funds to the investment menu.
Furthermore, significant explanatory power of participants' characteristics also requires the plan sponsors to pay attention to the demographic structure of the participants. For example, in an extreme case, compared to a 100% female company, a 100% male company needs to offer loan availability and life-cycle funds to balance out the overconfident effects of men.
Overall, our analysis provides the evidence that both participants and plan sponsors need to be aware of the behavior of opposite part. An employee seeking to maximize his net 401(k) saving needs to pay attention to the plan design features, because they significantly affect participants' trading behavior, and then their investment performance; an employer as fiduciary also need to take into account the impact on participants' trading behavior when it designs its 401(k) retirement plan.
Conclusion
Our analysis of 1.2 million 401(k) plan participants shows relatively little overall trading in DC retirement plans, with substantial heterogeneity.
We find that only 20% participants ever reshuffled their portfolios over a two-year period, indeed, most of the people never trade. Even when people do trade, it is rare and over half traders only trade once. Like previous studies, we find demographic characteristics can significantly explain trading activity: traders are older, wealthier, more highly paid, male employees with more money in their accounts. We also find plan design factors do have significant impact on 401(k) plan participants' trading behavior: participants trade more in plans with more investment choice, company stock, and international equity funds, and offering indexed funds, life-cycle funds, and loan availability reduce people's portfolio turnover. Finally, on-line access stimulates participants to trade more frequently, although they do not increase turnover ratio as much.
Our analysis also shows that trading activities in 401(k) plans differs from those in discount brokerage accounts. Compared to the results of Odean and his co-authors, individual investors seem likely to trade their asset through discount brokerage account rather than retirement saving:
investors trade 1.44 times annually in the discount brokerage accounts but only trade 0.30 time in the 401(k) accounts. This sharp contrast maybe comes from 1) self-selection problem in discount brokerage accounts, and 2) limited choice in investment menu.
Maybe one possible direction for future research is to check the relationship between 401(k) trading and portfolio returns. In our analysis, we only use the characteristics of participants, plans, and industries, as independent variables, and we do not take into account the market environment. By computing how trading influence investors' portfolio performance, maybe we would deepen our understanding of the trading behavior in 401(k) plans.
Another reason for the inertia trading activity of 401(k) accounts perhaps comes from the efficiency problem of investment options. Financial economics theory teaches us that a rational investor will always rebalance their assets in order to allocate their portfolio in the efficient frontier associated with their utility functions with the competitive market assumption. However, in the 401(k) context, the investment menu offered by plan sponsors may not span the efficient frontier 20 ; consequently, the potential inefficiency may have an impact on trading activity.
It deserves to note that our analysis only covers a short sample period of 2003-3004, which was an extremely bullish period for the U.S stock market. We need to extend the trading sample including the future period. Ideally, we want to include bearish market environment and check the robustness of the result in this paper.
Finally, in the future research, we plan to make a more detailed time-series approach to extend our future analysis. In particular, given the crucial role of the plan design features in participants' trading behavior, we need to evaluate how the plan design change influences employees' portfolio selection and investment performance in their retirement saving account, and therefore provides the policy implications to fund managers, record keepers, plan sponsors and policy makers. Fund number is the number of funds ever selected as an investment option. 2. If the household income is less than the median of the sample, then define it as in low group other wise define it as high group, and the median household income is $86,319. 3. If the IXI wealth is less than the median of the sample, then define it as low group, otherwise, define it as in high group, and the median is $35,735. 4. Statistics is for ratio of traders over active accounts per plan. 
# of Accounts
# of Traders
Appendix 1: Plan Status Identification
We identified participants' plan status with their contribution records. The basic idea is if an employee (EE) or his/her employer (ER) is contributing to his/her 401(k) account in a given month, then we define his/her plan status as active. If an employee is active for the whole sample period, then we define him/her as sample active, and we focus the observations with sample active plan status.
Because it is impossible to identify the ACCURATE contribution schedule for each account, we identified the plan status with the following decision rule.
Ø
Step 1: Categorize plans into 3 types by plan-level sample total contribution amount.
o If the plan-level total employee-contribution amount in sampled 2 years is equal to zero, and plan-level total employer-contribution amount is greater than zero, then define this plan as 'ER only' type.
o If the plan-level total employer-contribution amount in sampled 2 years is equal to zero, and plan-level total employee-contribution amount is greater than zero, then define this plan as 'EE only' type.
o If both the plan-level total employer-contribution amount and plan-level total employee-contribution amount in sampled 2 years are greater than zero, then define this plan as 'EE and ER' type.
Step 2: Define an account as "Active in a given month" according to the following rule:
o Case 1: The plan is an ER-only contribution plan.
àRULE: A given account is classified as active in that month if that account has any ER contribution within a plus/minus 12-month window, otherwise defines it as inactive.
o Case 2: The plan is an EE-only contribution plan. àRULE: An account is active that month if the account has a positive EE contribution in that month, otherwise define it as inactive.
o Case 3: The plan has both EE and ER contributions. à In this case, an account is active that month if the account has positive EE contribution; àELSE, for each account, compute EE contribution frequency over all months to ascertain whether the EE contribution has been positive at any time in the last 6 months.
àTHEN consider 2 cases as follows ♦ An account is active there is no any EE contribution in all months, but has some positive ER contribution within plus/minus 12-month window, otherwise define it as inactive. ♦ An account is active if there is some positive EE contribution in any of last 6 months, otherwise define it as inactive.
Step 3: Define an account to be "Continuously Active" if and only if it is active in all of the months from Jan 2003 -Dec 2004 . This is the group we would focus on in our trading analysis.
Appendix 2: Plan-wide Trading
In our sampled observations, we excluded plan-wide trades from our analysis. The reason is that plan-wide trades are not based on individual investors' own decision-making, but because employers drop some funds from the investment menu, employees are "forced" to exchange all of the balance in those funds to other possible options.
In practice, we defined plan-wide trades, only-plan-wide-trader as below.
If a fund satisfies either of the following two conditions in a given month, then we define all of the trades associated with that funds in that month as plan-wide trades. The conditions are 1) The fund balance in a given plan is less than 2% of that in previous month.
2) Some funds are traded in a given month by some accounts, but in that month, there is no balance even in plan to which those accounts belong.
We also defined some other trading concepts associated with plan-wide trades, and treat plan-wide trade as below in order to generate our interest dependent variables. 1) Only-plan-wide-trader: consider a sample trader as Only-plan-wide-trader if all of his/her trades within sampled 2 years are plan-wide trades. We regard Only-planwide-trader as non-trader.
